"To be a philosopher and to be a feminist are one and the same thing. A feminist is a woman who does not allow anyone to think in her place."-from _Hipparchia's Choice_ A work of rare insight and irreverence, _Hipparchia's Choice_ boldly recasts the history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the post-Derrideans as one of masculine texts and male problems. The position of women, therefore, is less the result of a hypothetical "femininity" and more the fault of exclusion by (...) men. Nevertheless, women have been and continue to be drawn to "the exercise of thought." So how does a female philosopher become a conceptually adventurous woman? Focusing on the work of Sartre and Beauvoir (specifically, his sexism and her relation to it), Michèle Le Doeuff shows how women philosophers can reclaim a place for feminist concerns. Is _The Second Sex_ a work of philosophy, and, if so, what can it teach us about the relation of philosophy to experience? Now with a new epilogue, _Hipparchia's Choice_ points the way toward a discipline that is accountable to history, feminism, and society. (shrink)

"The Philosophical Imaginary teaches us how to read philosophy afresh. Focusing on central, but often undiscussed, images, Le Doeuff's patient, perspicacious, and always brilliant readings show us how to uncover the political unconscious at work in great philosophy. Le Doeuff's contribution to philosophy and feminism is unequalled. This book is a classic.".

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

As a young philosopher, a third-generation atheist and already a feminist, Michèle Le Doeuff read the Bible on her own, without anybody’s guidance and on the basis of an assumed intellectual equality between the texts and herself. Later on, her friendship with Pamela Sue Anderson also developed thanks to their firm belief that a member of a given faith and an atheist can tolerate and indeed respect each other to the full through a common involvement in feminist philosophy. All (...) this defines a standpoint from which a host of questions can be raised and many topics transformed. (shrink)

This article argues that although Simone de Beauvoir goes as far as any philosopher in her analysis of oppressive myths, she too creates ‘others’ for herself, such as children who believe in dreams or fairy tales. Beauvoir's The Second Sex appears to make a clear distinction between myths and facts with respect to women's situation. The first volume of her autobiography, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, also critiques some of the myths which dominate women's lives; at the same time, the (...) adoption of Simone's mythologies by her younger sister Hélène is presented less as a myth structure than as an eclectic collection of good and bad objects that strives for coherence only in fantasy. Like the Greeks, the young Simone sets herself against ‘the Barbarians’ — to the embarrassment of the author. Myths and mythologies are the enemies of philosophy for Hegel amongst others. Yet while Beauvoir is clear about the importance of emancipation from religion, she does not find it easy to situate herself as a philosopher. Philosophy too has acted as an instrument of male domination. Perhaps Barthes's ‘mythologies’ provided a more comfortable framework for the analysis of bourgeois life in her autobiography — which includes a crucial element of self-critique. Equally, looking back on her later life, it is striking to what extent she continued to act out bourgeois mythologies of the role of the accepting woman in the face of male infidelity, just as her mother did. Perhaps her ascetic refusal to offer a positive image of a female heroine relates to this problematic relationship to the imaginary, saturated from childhood with mythologies that she wished to reject, and critiqued by the rational philosophical tradition which cannot acknowledge its own use of fiction. (shrink)

French Feminism Reader is a collection of essays representing the authors and issues from French theory most influential in the American context. The book is designed for use in courses, and it includes illuminating introductions to the work of each author. These introductions include biographical information, influences and intellectual context, major themes in the author's work as a whole, and specific introductions to the selections in this volume. This collection includes selections by Simone de Beauvoir, Christine Delphy, Colette Guilluamin, Monique (...) Wittig, Michele Le Doeuff, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, and Helene Cixious. (shrink)

Michèle Le Doeuff's "Primal Scene": Prohibition and Confidence in the Education of a Woman My essay begins with Michèle Le Doeuff's singular account of the "primal scene" in her own education as a woman, illustrating a universally significant point about the way in which education can differ for men and women: gender difference both shapes and is shaped by the imaginary of a culture as manifest in how texts matter for Le Doeuff. Her primal scene is the (...) first moment she remembers when, while aspiring to think for herself, a prohibition is placed in her reading of literature. Her philosophyteacher—at a boys' school—told the young Michèle that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was "too difficult" for her to read. In recalling this scene, the older Michèle—now, a woman philosopher—directs her readers to this text by Kant, in order to demonstrate how knowledge has been constrained by the narrative and imagery in the text of a philosopher; similarly, in the texts of others. She finds the central imagery of Kant's text for setting the limits to human knowledge in his account of "the island of understanding," or "land of truth," surrounded by "a stormy sea" of uncertainty; the latter image also retains a seductive appeal, threatening to destroy the confidence of any knower who ventures out beyond the well-marked out island. Moreover, women have often been associated with the dangers at sea beyond the safety of the island, where falsehood and worse reign. I propose that "text matters" here not only for gender issues, but for the postcolonial theory which Le Doeuff's reading of island imagery enhances in western literature and culture. The suggestion is that women in the history of ideas have been more susceptible than men to prohibitions : women's negative education is against going beyond certain boundaries which have been fixed by a generally colonialist culture on the grounds of gender-hierarchies. I stress the significance of confidence in the production of knowledge. A lack or an inhibition of confidence in one's own ability to think critically risks the damaging exclusions of, for example, colonialism and sexism. My aim is to unearth the political biases evident in textual imagery, while also pointing to new epistemic locations, with island-and-sea imagery that transgresses patriarchal prohibition, liberating subjects for confident reading and writing of texts today. (shrink)

Michèle Le Doeuff's research interests include British Renaissance philosophy (especially the works of Francis Bacon and Thomas More) and the writings of Shakespeare. However, she is best known in Anglo‐American philosophy for her writings on the philosophical imaginary and feminism. Le Doeuff is a somewhat idiosyncratic figure in contemporary French philosophy. As Colin Gordon has remarked, her work “shows no systematic affiliation, no signs of a formative debt or repudiation” (translator's Preface, Le Doeuff 1989, p. vi). Le (...) Doeuff does, however, mention the work of Simone de beauvoir (see Article 22), Gaston Bachelard, Michel Foucault (Article 49) and Gilles deleuze (Article 51) as contributing to the development of her own philosophical stance. As we shall see, this issue of discipleship is pertinent to her appraisal of the historical situation of women in philosophy. She states “one is commonly asked whether one is a this man‐ian or a that manian … once one becomes a whoeverian, that is the end of philosophy and of the desire for intellectual independence which should also be a characteristic of feminism” (1991, pp. 59–60). (shrink)

The unthought means that which it is possible to think, but which has not yet been thought, and also what we are prevented from thinking. Philosophical systems can prevent us from thinking otherwise and restrictions on women’s access to knowledge can prevent women from thinking apart from what is prescribed as suitable. The unthought is both what hasn’t been thought and what could be thought if there wasn’t a barrier of some sort. Michèle Le Dœuff directs us towards the unthought (...) as a measure of the extent to which writers on women’s education have allowed the possibility of women’s access to the unthought, not just to received knowledge to date. This unthought is also connected to creativity and originality, and philosophy that is not systematic. In this paper, I elucidate the nature of Michèle Le Dœuff’s project and the structure of her argument in The Sex of Knowing (2003) through the idea of the unthought. (shrink)

In this paper I show how Michèle Le Dœuff’s conception of philosophy as work is central to her articulation of a fresh conception of women’s role in philosophy and philosophy’s relation to other work. In Hipparchia’s Choice (1991, 168) she writes that ‘There is at least a third way of conceiving of philosophy and the history of philosophy: we can regard both as work, and thus as a dynamic, which can lead to and from each other.’ My objective is to (...) clarify this concept of philosophy as work and to show its significance and implications for understanding women’s relation to philosophy and the complexity of Le Dœuff’s thought concerning the nature of freedom and oppression. (shrink)

Reproduit quatre conférences faites en 1946 et 1947 sous ce titre au Collège de philosophie, et interroge la notion de temps comme limitation même de l'être fini ou comme relation de l'être fini à Dieu (Electre).

« Pourquoi les choses tiennent-elles ensemble ? » (Traité d'ontologie, 2009, p. 237). Cette citation me sert de départ à une réflexion sur la nature des relations liantes souvent appelées relations de comprésence à la suite de Russell, ces bundling relations qui nouent les propriétés ensembles pour constituer les objets ordinaires (tables, chaises, individus biologiques) selon la théorie du faisceau. De même que Frédéric Nef, je suis séduit par les nombreuses vertus philosophiques de ces relations liantes. Ma contribution ne portera (...) pas sur une critique ou une défense de ces relations mais sur l'étude de leur nature, et en particulier, de leur possible nature méréologique. Je vais esquisser rapidement certains aspects de la théorie classique du faisceau que je qualifierai de réaliste pour opposer ensuite les variantes réalistes à deux autres versions méréologiques de la théorie, que je qualifierai d'éliminativistes. (shrink)

Les Cyniques grecs ne nous ont pas l gu de savants trait s. Leur philosophie, plut t pragmatique, s'exprimait par l'observance d'une vie asc tique franchement marginale. Le lecteur d couvrira dans ces fragments qui leur sont attribu s, dans ces t moignages de contemporains, pr sent s ici dans leur version fran aise, l'univers et l'id al des Cyniques. Le texte de cette nouvelle dition a t enti rement revu par l'auteur. Les recherches effectu es depuis la premi re (...) publication (1975) ont permis de compl ter plusieurs sections et d'y inclure des fragments nouveaux et des traductions r centes. Une bibliographie enti rement r vis e et deux nouveaux index viennent compl ter l'ouvrage. (shrink)

Arguing for Atheism introduces a wide range of topics in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics. Robin Le Poidevin does not simply defend a denial of God's existence; he presents instead a way of intepreting religious discourse which allows us to make sense of the role of religion in our spiritual and moral lives. Ideal as a textbook for university courses in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics, Arguing for Atheism is also designed to be accessible, in its style and (...) its numerous explanations, to the general reader. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce qui peut venir à l’idée qui n’y soit pas déjà, en quelque façon, contenu, ou qui ne soit pas déjà à la mesure de l’idée? Ne faudrait-il pas, pour rendre pensable l’absolu – pour trouver un sens à Dieu – contester que la pensée soit coextensive à la conscience en guise d’un savoir toujours corrélatif de l’être et, dès lors, que la philosophie coïncide avec l’ontologie?Ce livre essaie de suggérer que le sens signifie non pas exclusivement sous la figure (...) de signifiants – choses, signes, mots – renvoyant à des signifiés; qu’il signifie, plus anciennement, à partir du visage humain, comme quand on dit signifier un ordre ou ordonner. Signifiance originelle du visage perçant sans cesse ses formes plastiques et représentées qui sans cesse se referme sur la voix silencieuse ou inouïe du commandement signifié! Eveil et dévotion suscités en guise d’un moi libéré de soi, libéré pour le prochain, même si l’on s’obstine à n’y trouver que représentation et conscience de soi. (shrink)

Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard, mais il suffit d'un seul pour le faire exister. Pour faire exister quoi, au juste? Certainement pas, hypostasiés, le hasard ou la fortune. Et si ce qu'on appelle hasard était coextensif aux innombrables coups de dés qui en relèvent? Y a-t-il d'abord, dans l'existence très en général, autre chose que des coups de dés (même s'ils se passent de dés et ne prennent pas forcément la forme de coups)? Localement, il semble bien (...) y avoir des nécessités ou, sur un autre plan, des mérites, mais que subsiste-t-il d'eux à l'échelle impensable de la pluralité des mondes? À remarquer qu'en tant que paysans, attachés au mieux à la localité terre, il est heureux que nous puissions essayer de nous raccrocher à quelque nécessité ou mérite, car vivre un "pur" hasard incessant risquerait fort de nous disloquer l'entendement et le reste. Mourir, c'est au moins devoir être arraché à notre échelle humaine (je ne me risquerai pas à dire que c'est en changer). Le problème, c'est que nous y tenons beaucoup à cette échelle, à cette mesure de toutes choses : aux aléas et aux nécessités, aux mérites et aux démérites, etc., de l'existence humaine. Il semble à nombre d'entre nous que cela vaut beaucoup mieux que rien, puisque mourir condamne pour eux à l'inexistence. "Rien" est ce drôle de mot qui, étymologiquement, dit la chose pour en arriver, dans notre langue, à dire la non-chose. Il suggère à sa façon que nous n'arrivons pas à penser la mort autrement que comme une négation de nos choses (êtres, affaires, faits, etc.). "Néant", si on s'en tient à son étymologie, est pire encore, car il peut signifier"non-race". Pourtant, nos choses sont bel et bien hasardeuses. Intégralement, aucune nécessité ne les ordonne et aucun mérite (ni démérite) n'en rend compte ; loin s'en faut. (shrink)

A sequel to Levinas's Totality and Infinity, this work is generally considered Levinas's most important contribution to the contemporary debate surrounding the closure of metaphysical discourse, much commented upon by Jacques Derrida. This work contains a fundamentally original theory of the ethical relationship and describes the face-to-face relationship, sensibility, responsibility and speech. Renowned Levinas scholar Richard A. Cohen has contributed a new foreword to this edition of Otherwise than Being, which is also the first time the work is available in (...) an affordable paperback edition. This foreword, along with Alphonso Lingis's extensive introduction to the work, is a valuable tool for researchers and students of Levinas's philosophy. (shrink)

Preface: The Shameful face of Philosophy In fact, Socrates talks about laden asses, blacksmiths, cobblers and tanners1 Whether one looks for a ...

In this brillant meditation on conceptions of history, Le Goff traces the evolution of the historian's craft. Examining real and imagined oppositions between past and present, ancient and modern, oral and written history, _History and Memory_ reveals the strands of continuity that have characterized historiography from ancient Mesopotamia to modern Europe.

The so-called Baldwin Effect generally says how learning, as a form of ontogenetic adaptation, can influence the process of phylogenetic adaptation, or evolution. This idea has also been taken into computation in which evolution and learning are used as computational metaphors, including evolving neural networks. This paper presents a technique called evolving self-taught neural networks – neural networks that can teach themselves without external supervision or reward. The self-taught neural network is intrinsically motivated. Moreover, the self-taught neural network is the (...) product of the interplay between evolution and learning. We simulate a multi-agent system in which neural networks are used to control autonomous agents. These agents have to forage for resources and compete for their own survival. Experimental results show that the interaction between evolution and the ability to teach oneself in self-taught neural networks outperform evolution and self-teaching alone. More specifically, the emergence of an intelligent foraging strategy is also demonstrated through that interaction. Indications for future work on evolving neural networks are also presented. (shrink)

Parce que ses applications concernent la plupart des dimensions de l'action humaine, que son organisation et sa dynamique ne sont plus dissociables de celles de la cité, la science rencontre naturellement les normes qui régissent le comportement humain, celles de la morale ou du droit. Nombre de controverses et de débats concernant les sciences et les technologies en témoignent : s'y invitent tour à tour des normes sociales, éthiques, scientifiques et techniques, et l'on évoque même des "normes du vivant". Ces (...) différentes normes renvoient-elles à des phénomènes comparables? Sont-elles réellement de même nature? La science bouscule les régimes de normes, mais elle est elle-même questionnée quant à sa responsabilité, son éthique ou sa déontologie. Comment science, éthique et droit interagissent-ils et selon quelle dynamique? Comment de nouvelles normes émergent-elles? Les normes juridiques et éthiques sont-elles toujours en retard par rapport aux sciences? Si les sciences et les technologies entretiennent une perpétuelle et stimulante incertitude, cette même incertitude rend parfois difficile l'entente sur les usages. Sciences et société n'évoluent pas nécessairement au même rythme, tandis que le champ des normes, qui ne cesse de s'accroître et de se complexifier, est, pour le droit, source d'indétermination. Penser le progrès comme la capacité à partager des normativités et des normes, telle est l'ambition de cet ouvrage, issu de la quatrième université d'été de l'IHEST qui a exploré sous cet angle les relations entre science, éthique et droit. (shrink)